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Introduction
The 1981 Budget is principally remembered for the decision to raise taxes
in the depths of the worst UK recession for a generation. By tightening
fiscal policy in a slump, Margaret Thatcher’s government flew in the face
of the post-war Keynesian orthodoxy, famously incurring the wrath of the
economics establishment. But, while the major public debates were over
fiscal policy, an often neglected driver of the 1981 Budget was the need to
restore monetary policy credibility. Like its Labour predecessor, the
Conservative government had placed the fight against inflation at the
heart of economic policy. Unlike its predecessor, it hoped to win the battle
without resorting to an incomes policy.
1
In March 1980, in line with
Milton Friedman’s dictum that ‘inflation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon’, Sir Geoffrey Howe launched the Medium-
Term Financial Strategy, laying out a four-year series of declining target
ranges for the broad money supply (£M3), and explaining that ‘control
of the money supply will over a period of years reduce the rate of
inflation’.2
In March 1981, with £M3 growth significantly above target and infla-
tion still higher than when they had taken office, ministers recognised that
the monetary leg of the MTFS was flawed.3 This chapter explains why it
This chapter draws upon D. J. Needham, UK monetary policy from devaluation to Thatcher,
1967–82 (Basingstoke, 2014), and I acknowledge the kind permission of PalgraveMacmillan
in consenting to its inclusion here.
1 There was, of course, no escaping the government’s obligations towards determining
incomes in the public sector.
2
£M3 comprised currency in circulation with the public and the sterling deposits of UK
residents. There was also a declining four-year ‘projection’ for the PSBR, intended to be
‘consistent with achieving the planned reduction in the growth of money supply over the
medium term with lower interest rates’: FSBR 1980–81, 16, 19.
3 The final RPI release before the 1979 election showed prices rising by 9.8 per cent in the
year toMarch 1979. InMarch 1981 inflation stood at 12.6 per cent, having peaked at 21.9
per cent in May 1980.
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was flawed. Sir Adam Ridley suggests elsewhere in this volume that
budgetmaking is like organising a naval convoy. Here I extend the analogy
to policy making in general. Successful monetary policy implementation
requires that all three members of the ‘macroeconomic executive’ – the
government, the Treasury and the Bank of England – be travelling in the
same direction, if not always at precisely the same speed.4 In 1980–81
the government, the Treasury and the Bank were heading in broadly the
same direction on fiscal policy. The same could not be said of monetary
policy. With a brief history of monetary targeting in the United Kingdom,
this chapter shows why the Bank and sections of the Treasury were
sceptical about the monetary leg of the MTFS from the outset.
As Table 9.1 shows, monetary targets in various guises had been in
place since the late 1960s. Some were published, others were known only
to a handful of politicians and officials. Few conformed to any narrow
monetarist definition of a ‘target’. As Christopher Allsopp points out,
‘Monetary targets may have many justifications other than those that
arise conventionally from monetarist theories.’
5
Monetarists do not have
a monopoly on monetary targets.6 What matters is the level of commit-
ment. What the authorities did as a consequence of monetary targets,
unpublished or published, usually proved to be more important than what
they said.
Experience of operating monetary targets in the 1970s had persuaded
many senior Bank and Treasury officials that tight control over the
broad money supply was impracticable in an open economy such as the
United Kingdom. That is not to suggest that they were against monetary
targets per se. TheM3 target announced byDenisHealey in July 1976was
pressed upon him by the Bank of England’s Governor, Gordon
Richardson, with the support of his Keynesian Chief Economist,
Christopher Dow. It was blessed by a sceptical Permanent Secretary to
the Treasury, Sir DouglasWass, for the beneficial impact it might have on
market sentiment. Healey’s money supply targets were designed for a
specific set of circumstances in the 1970s. They were conceived partly
to replace the financial discipline lost after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates and partly as an adjunct to incomes
4 The term ‘macroeconomic executive’ is from J. S. Fforde, ‘Settingmonetary objectives’, in
Bank of England, The development and operation of monetary policy 1960–1983: a selection of
material from the Quarterly Bulletin of the Bank of England (Oxford, 1984), 65.
5 C. J. Allsopp, ‘Macroeconomic policy: design and performance’, in M. J. Artis and
D. P.Cobham (eds.), Labour’s economic policies, 1974–1979 (Manchester, 1991), 30.
6 For an explanation of how a Keynesian could reconcile himself to monetary targets, see
Hacche and Taylor, Inside the Bank of England, 61–2.
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policy in the battle against inflation. They grew into a fiscal constraint on
the spending ambitions of the Labour government. For reasons that are
explained below, this pointed to targets for the broad money supply. But
few doubted the fiscal convictions of the Thatcher government after 1979.
The Bank’s unease with the MTFS stemmed largely from the choice of
Table 9.1 Unpublished and published DCE,M3 and £M3 objectives, 1968–79
Period Objective Outturn Source
M3 1968 Below £1.2 billion £986 million 1967 Letter of Intent
DCE 1969/70 Below £400 million minus £541 million 1969 Letter of Intent
DCE 1970/71 Below £900 million £1.4 billion 1970 Budget speech
M3 1971/72 3% per quarter 15% in 1971/72 1971 Budget speech
M3 1972/73 20% 27% Unpublished
M3 1973/74 ‘Not more than 15%’ 25% Unpublished
M3 1974/75 Below nominal GDP 10% (vs 13% GDP) November 1974 Budget
M3 1975/76 Below nominal GDP 9% (vs 26% GDP) 1975 Budget speech
M3 1976/77 Below nominal GDP 10% (vs 18% GDP) 1976 Budget speech
M3 1976/77 12% 10% 22 July 1976 Statement
£M3 1976/77 9–13% 8% December 1976
mini-Budget
DCE 1976/77 £9 billion £3.8 billion 1976 Letter of Intent
£M3 1977/78 9–13% 16% 1977 Budget speech
DCE 1977/78 £7.7 billion £4.1 billion 1976 Letter of Intent
£M3 1978/79 8–12% 11% 1978 Budget speech
DCE 1978/79 £6 billion £6.8 billion 1976 Letter of Intent
Sources: D. P. Cobham, The making of monetary policy in the UK, 1975–2000 (Chichester,
2002), 50; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin; ONS; Hansard; the National Archives.7
7 There were also ceilings for bank lending and bank deposits (the ‘corset’) for much of the
period. For the 1968M3 target, see L. J. Callaghan, ‘Letter of Intent’, 28 November 1967,
TNA, T326/730; and I. d. L. Radice, ‘Working party no. 3: speaking notes for Sir
D. Rickett’, 28 November 1967, TNA, T326/730 (which specifies £1.2 billion). For the
1971/72 quarterly target, seeHCDeb., 30March 1971, vol. 814, col. 1374; andC. J. Riley,
‘Monetary assumption’, 1 October 1971, TNA,T338/68. For the 1972/73 unpublished 20
per cent target, see D. V. A. Allen, ‘Monetary policy – post-Budget’, 21 March 1972,
TNA, T326/1562; A. M. Bailey, ‘Monetary policy – post-budget, 23 March 1972, TNA,
T326/1562; and F. Cassell, ‘Monetary policy’, 26 April 1972, TNA, T326/1562. For the
1973/74 unpublished 15 per cent target, seeG. S.Downey, ‘Monetary policy’, 16 February
1973, TNA, T233/2505. For 1974/75, see HC Deb., 12 November 1974, vol. 881, c256;
and J. B. Page, ‘Monetary policy’, 24 October 1974, BOE, 6A50/14. For 1975/76, see HC
Deb., 15 April 1975, vol. 890, c279; and P. E. Middleton, ‘Possible monetary policy
objectives’, 31 October 1975, TNA, T386/274. For the 1976/77 ‘below nominal GDP
target’, seeHCDeb., 6 April 1976, vol. 909, c237. Samuel Brittan interpreted this tomean
a 15 per centM3 target: S. Brittan, ‘Another gamble on incomes policy’, Financial Times, 7
April 1976. The remaining targets are all a matter of public record.
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monetary aggregate.
8
The econometric relationship between narrow
money (M1) and nominal income had survived the monetary upheavals
of the 1970s; the relationship between £M3 and inflation had not.9
In 1980 Conservative ministers launched a medium-term strategy based
not on econometric evidence but on the beneficial impact monetary
targets might have on confidence and expectations. A strategy based on
managing down inflationary expectations relied on the government
actually hitting its targets. For this, they had chosen the wrong aggregate.
In doing so, they subjected themselves, and the British economy, to a
monetary policy roller-coaster ride.
A brief history of UK monetary targets
In the 1960s British monetary policy was guided by the findings of the
1959 Radcliffe Report. The report dismissed the importance of the mon-
etary aggregates: ‘“The supply of money” – whatever that may be made to
mean – is not by itself a reliable policy measure.’
10
With the demand for
money assumed to be unstable, monetary policy was assigned a subordi-
nate role to fiscal policy in managing aggregate demand: ‘[M]onetary
measures can help, but that is all.’11 Insofar as the UK authorities did
look at money, it was within a framework that divided the broad money
supply (M3) into its counterparts, principally bank lending to the private
sector and the public sector borrowing requirement.12 In an era of (gen-
erally) balanced budgets, this meant ceilings on bank lending to the
private sector. The Radcliffe Report had warned that ceilings were inim-
ical to an efficient banking system.13 They froze lending at an arbitrary
date, favoured established bank customers at the expense of newer
businesses and inhibited competition between the banks. Nonetheless,
ceilings remained in place for most of the 1960s. This is because, with
8 Officials were also nervous about extending targets out over a four-year period.
9 M1 comprised currency in circulation with the public and UK residents’ sterling sight
deposits with UK banks. In September 1977, despite ‘a touching faith that improved
econometric techniques would save the day’, Bank officials finally admitted that ‘there is
no obvious simple, single equation, demand for M3 balances’: Hotson, ‘British monetary
targets, 1976 to 1987’, 6.
10
Radcliffe Committee, Cmnd 827, para. 504. 11 Ibid., para. 514.
12 The counterparts approach analysed the flow of funds between sectors such that ΔM3 =
Δ currency +Δ reserves + bank lending to the private sector + bank holding of government
securities – Δ non-bank liabilities: F.H. Capie, The Bank of England: 1950s to 1979 (New
York, 2010), 28. Batini andNelson trace this approach toM.W.Holtrop’s 1958 evidence
to the Radcliffe Committee, based on his earlier IMF staff paper: Batini andNelson, ‘The
UK’s rocky road to stability’, 31.
13
Radcliffe Committee, Cmnd 827, para. 527.
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sterling fixed under the Bretton Woods regime, attempts to run the
economy at full employment led to a succession of balance of payments
crises as demand increased imports and diverted exports back to the
domestic market. With a chronic shortage of foreign currency reserves
in the 1960s, balance of payments crises often meant recourse to the
International Monetary Fund.
Britain borrowed more from the IMF than any other country in the
1960s.14 Initially, loans came with low conditionality.15 The shift in
emphasis came after loans to the new Labour government in November
1964 and May 1965. The Treasury explained:
The Government’s undertakings to the IMF as a result of the extensive use of the
Fund’s facilities during this period compelled the authorities to modify their
approach to monetary policy. . . [W]hile policy continued to place great emphasis
on controlling bank lending to the private sector, greater attention was paid to
money supply and to domestic credit expansion.
16
To secure another IMF loan after devaluation in November 1967, the
Chancellor, James Callaghan, acknowledged ‘the expectation at present
that bank credit expansion will be sufficiently limited to ensure that the
growth of the money supply will be less in 1968 than the present estimate
for 1967’.
17
Accordingly, the banks were told to freeze aggregate lending
at the mid-November 1967 level. This was the first time that a lending
ceiling had been publicly linked to IMF assistance, because of the stigma
attached to having policy imposed from outside.18The link was cemented
in May 1969 when Callaghan’s successor, Roy Jenkins, agreed to a pub-
lished £400 million domestic credit expansion ceiling, comprised of an
14 Britain drew upon IMF resources in 1948, 1956, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1968 and 1969 (and
again in 1972, 1976 and 1977).
15 In 1959 a Treasury official suggested that ‘it would be repugnant to the dignity of a
country of the UK’s status’ to have any conditions applied to IMF loans: ‘Note to
D. H. F. Rickett’, 8 May 1959, TNA, T236/5740 [emphasis in original]. Increasing
conditionality was also a result of the United Kingdom borrowing higher ‘tranches’ of
its IMF quota. Borrowing from the first ‘gold’ tranche came with few strings attached. As
members drew on successively higher credit tranches (each 25 per cent thick), however,
they could expect increasingly harsh conditionality from the IMF.
16
‘Control of credit in the private sector’, T267/30, 3.
17 In November 1967 the ‘present estimate’ for M3 growth in 1967 was £1.2 billion: Radice,
‘Working party no. 3: speaking notes’, T326/730; Callaghan, ‘Letter of Intent’, T326/730.
18 The 1961 loan came after an ‘IMF-friendly’ statement by Selwyn Lloyd, the then
Chancellor: B.M.Clift and J.D.Tomlinson, ‘Negotiating credibility: Britain and the
International Monetary Fund, 1956–1976’, Contemporary European History, 17, 4
(November 2008), 552. In 1965 the IMF insisted that bank advances to the private sector
over the next year be limited to 105 per cent of the April 1965 total: ‘Control of credit in
the private sector’, T267/30, 5.
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unpublished £250 million target and a £150 million margin of error, as a
condition for a further loan.19
DCEwas the IMF’s preferred aggregate and adjusted themoney supply
for financing of the balance of payments from official reserves.20 It rested
on the assumption, shared with the monetarists, that the demand for
money was both stable and predictable.21 In order to test this assumption,
the Bank set up the internal Money Supply Group in October 1968.
Despite initial hostility towards the ‘neo-quantity theorists’, members
found themselves agreeing with a number of core monetarist principles.
22
Disavowing the Radcliffe Report, they found that the velocity of circula-
tion (and therefore the demand for money), was ‘fairly stable’ – a con-
clusion that was ‘generally consistent with the quantity theory point
of view as expounded by Friedman’.23 The group’s final report was
published in 1970. It stated that, ‘in the United Kingdom, movements
in the money stock have preceded movements in money incomes’
and that, ‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a consistent lead
is a prima facie indication of causation’.
24
Combined with the evidence
that the demand for money could be controlled with interest rates, this
was a powerful rejection of the Radcliffian approach. As the principal
author of the Money Supply Group’s final report, Charles Goodhart,
pointed out:
The main conclusions of this were that the chief intermediate objectives of
monetary policy should be the rates of growth of the monetary aggregates,
i.e. the money stock, in one or other of its various definitions, or DCE
(and not particular components of these, such as bank lending to the private
sector).25
The Money Supply Group’s theoretical work underpinned the intro-
duction of Competition and Credit Control by Ted Heath’s government
in 1971, recognised by Forrest Capie as ‘the biggest change in monetary
19 A. J. C. Edwards, ‘Note for the record: domestic credit expansion and the central govern-
ment borrowing requirement’, 12 May 1969, TNA, T326/979; ‘Control of credit in the
private sector’, T267/30, 22.
20 The IMF’s initial focus was on the central bank’s balance sheet (i.e. the monetary base).
After negotiation, officials persuaded the Fund that, in the United Kingdom’s case, DCE
should be predicated on the broad money supply.
21 David Laidler refers to the stability of the demand for money as the sine qua non of
monetarism: D.E.W. Laidler, Monetarist perspectives (Oxford, 1982), vii.
22 In January 1969Goodhart wrote that he ‘was not sorry to see evidence unfavourable to the
neo-quantity theorists’: C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘Visit to Mr A. O. Hughes of Nottingham
University on 28th January’ (covering note), 31 January 1969, London, BOE, 2A128/1.
23 A. D. Crockett, ‘The velocity of circulation of money’, 2 April 1969, BOE, 2A128/2.
24 Goodhart and Crockett, ‘The importance of money’, 176–7.
25 Goodhart, Monetary theory and practice, 96.
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policy since the Second World War’.
26
CCC swept away the panoply of
lending controls in use throughout the 1960s and replaced them with the
‘interest rate weapon’ –more active use of Bank Rate to control the broad
money supply. This was recognised at the time by politicians, officials,
practitioners and academics alike. Commending the proposal to the
Prime Minister, the Chancellor, Anthony Barber, wrote that ‘the new
systemwill operate on themoney supply as a whole, putting more reliance
on changes in interest rates’.27 In February 1971, opening the first meet-
ing to discuss the Bank’s proposal, the Permanent Secretary to the
Treasury, Sir Douglas Allen, declared: ‘It should be assumed that it was
still desired to have a numerical target for the monetary aggregates.’28
Explaining the policy to his clients four months later, the influential City
analyst Gordon Pepper, of W. Greenwell & Co., explained that ‘the main
emphasis will be placed on attempting to control the domestic money
supply’.29 The monetarist academic Brian Griffiths agreed: ‘The inten-
tion of the new system is to move away from control of bank lending to
control of one of “the broader money aggregates”.’
30
CCC was predicated upon more flexible use of Bank Rate. This
produced the first unpublished M3 target, in March 1972.31 In his 1972
Budget, Barber announced a 5 per cent real GDP growth target. The
Bank’s demand for money equations estimated that M3 would have to
grow by 20 per cent simply to accommodate the fiscal stimulus
announced in the Budget.32 Less than 20 per cent and the government
might not finance its 5 per cent GDP growth target; more than 20 per cent
26 Capie, The Bank of England, 427.
27 A. P. L. Barber, ‘New approach to credit control’, 6 May 1971, TNA, T338/40.
28 D. A. Harding, ‘Minutes of a meeting held on 18 February 1971 to discuss the Bank of
England paper’, 22 February 1971, TNA, T326/1261.
29 G.T. Pepper, ‘The gilt-edgedmarket and the Bank of England’s proposals’, June 1971, 1,
Churchill, THCR AS 3/17.
30 B. Griffiths, ‘Resource efficiency, monetary policy and the reform of the UK banking
system’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 5, 1 (February 1973), 72.
31 Susan Howson concludes that monetary targets ‘could not be seriously adopted until the
government had given up the commitment to a fixed exchange rate’ in June 1972. An
independent monetary policy is compatible with a fixed currency, however, if the foreign
exchange reserves are sufficient. As Brian Tew and Peter Browning point out, the return
to current account surplus in 1971 was an important factor in the timing of CCC. With
less strain on the currency reserves, monetary policy could increasingly be directed
towards the domestic economy. S.K. Howson, ‘Money and monetary policy since
1945’, in R.C. Floud and P.A. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge economic history of modern
Britain, vol. III, Structural change and growth, 1939–2000 (Cambridge, 2004), 157;
J.H.B. Tew, ‘Monetary policy: part I’, in F.T.Blackaby (ed.), British economic policy,
1960–74 (Cambridge, 1978), 239; P. Browning, The Treasury and economic policy, 1964–
1985 (London, 1986), 276.
32 F. Cassell, ‘Monetary policy – post-Budget’, 20 March 1972, TNA, T326/1562.
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and there might be an additional, unwanted, monetary stimulus. This
would run the risk of overheating the economy. But 20 per cent M3
growth was unprecedented. Heath had already shown his hostility towards
the higher interest rates that would be required to rein in any excessive
monetary growth, either by increasing the cost of bank lending, or by
raising yields on new gilt-edged securities.33 In an attempt to secure the
interest rate flexibility demanded by CCC, the Bank and the Treasury
turned the 20 per cent M3 forecast into a target:
Numerical targets for money supply were not given in the Budget Speech. But the
Chancellor has accepted our advice that for the present policy should be directed
towards a target rate of growth of money supply of about 20% in the financial year
1972/73 – 20% being the growth which the Bank of England’s demand-for-money
equations suggest will be required, given the outlook for real output and prices, if
there is to be no significant rise in interest rates from their present levels.
34
What followed was one of the most intense periods of monetary chaos
in recent British history. By the time the policy was de facto abandoned, in
December 1973, M3 had grown by 72 per cent. Britain’s highest ever
inflation followed hard on the heels of Competition and Credit Control,
apparently vindicating Friedman’s assertion that excess monetary growth
leads inevitably to higher prices after a lag. There also followed the worst
banking crisis since the nineteenth century, and, despite its adroit han-
dling of the ‘Lifeboat’ operation to rescue the stricken secondary banks
after the property boom ended in 1973, the Bank’s reputation suffered a
serious blow.35 Failure to control the money supply under Competition
and Credit Control would shape the Bank’s attitude to monetary policy
for years to come.
There were a number of technical problems with the unpublished M3
target agreed in March 1972.36 But the simple fact was, despite the
econometric evidence that had suggested otherwise in 1970, it was just
33 For a fuller explanation of Heath’s reluctance to raise Bank Rate, see D. J. Needham,
‘Britain’s money supply experiment, 1971–73’, Cambridge Working Paper in Social
and Economic History no. 10 (2012), available online at www.econsoc.hist.cam.ac.uk/
working_papers.html.
34 Capie implies that the Treasury was trying to cap interest rates and M3 at the same time.
They were not. They were trying to ensure that M3 growth above 20 per cent would
trigger a higher Bank Rate. Capie, The Bank of England, 646; F. Cassell, ‘Monetary
policy’, 26 April 1972, TNA, T326/1562.
35 During the ‘Heath–Barber boom’ house pricesmore than doubled and commercial prices
nearly trebled. See M. I. Reid, The secondary banking crisis, 1973–75: its causes and course
(London, 1982); Capie, The Bank of England, 524–86; C. Gordon, The Cedar story: the
night the City was saved (London, 1993).
36 See Needham, UK monetary policy, for a detailed discussion of the technical problems
associated with CCC.
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not possible to exercise tight control over the broad money supply in the
United Kingdom, especially when the power to set interest rates lay in the
hands of a politician such as Ted Heath who was more committed to a
high-profile GDP growth target than to an unpublished M3 target. Heath
was concerned that higher interest rates would be construed as a return to
the ‘stop-go’ policies of the 1960s.37 He was also worried that higher debt
servicing and mortgage costs would derail the delicate negotiations with
the employers and unions over incomes policies, then seen as the natural
solution to cost-push inflation. As the President of the Confederation of
British Industry pointed out in 1972, ‘The recently announced further
increase in bank base rates to 7% will damage the prospects of agreement
on a package to contain inflation.’38 Clearly, the CBI had not been bitten
by the monetarist bug.
After M3 growth of 27 per cent in 1972/73, the Bank was told to find a
way of controlling the money supply that did not rely on higher interest
rates.39 The result was the supplementary special deposits scheme (the
‘corset’), which penalised banks that grew their interest-bearing liabilities
(deposits) above published thresholds, themselves derived from unpub-
lished M3 targets.40 The Bank explained: ‘The prime objective of this
device is, quite simply, to contain the growth of M3. A second objective is
to avoid producing any perceptible further upthrust to the general level of
interest rates.’41
Different institutions drew different conclusions from the failure of
CCC. In 1975 Goodhart admitted:
The monetarist edifice rests largely on the stability, and predictability, of the
demand-for-money function. Econometric study of the data in the 1960s had
suggested that in the UK we, too, could build parts of our monetary policy on
this basis. Subsequent experience has revealed weakness in this foundation.
42
That same year he formulated Goodhart’s law: ‘Any observed
statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed on it for
control purposes.’Thiswas not abstract theorising; it was a reflection on the
painful experience of failing to control M3 under Competition and Credit
Control.
The Bank concluded that M3 was a ‘decidedly defective’ measure and
began a long campaign to shift the emphasis to M1, which continued to
37
‘R. T. Armstrong to A. M. Bailey’, 16 June 1972, TNA, T326/1563.
38 G. S. Downey, ‘Bank base rates and the CBI’, 24 July 1972, TNA, T326/1564.
39
‘A. P. L. Barber to G. W. H. Richardson’, 15 November 1973, TNA, T233/2508.
40 Capie, The Bank of England, 521.
41 A. L. Coleby, ‘Controlling growth in M3’, 29 November 1973, BOE, 6A50/12.
42 Goodhart, Monetary theory and practice, 113.
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enjoy a more robust econometric relationship with nominal GDP.
43
The
Treasury had always been sceptical of the Bank’s ability to control the
money supply, and fell back on its traditional remedy for cost-push
inflation: incomes policy. Just as officials were retreating from M3,
however, Conservative ministers were becoming increasingly enthusiastic
targeters. The Financial Secretary, TerenceHiggins, responded to Allen’s
recommendation of a 15 per cent target ahead of the 1973 Budget by
arguing that ‘we are aiming too low and should go for 13% rather than
15% as a target growth of money supply (M3)’.
44
The Minister of State,
John Nott, was persuaded against publishing the target only because it
would look too high compared to the Europeans, who had recently agreed
to limit money supply growth to 6 per cent, albeit on a narrower measure
than M3.45
The Conservatives were out of office by March 1974. The monetary
objective of the new Labour Chancellor, Denis Healey, was to keep M3
growth at or below nominal GDP growth.46With the economy moribund
in the post-oil-shock recession, and inflation high, this was easily
achieved. In July 1975, however, with inflation above 25 per cent,
Healey launched a new incomes policy. Wage increases would be limited
to £6 per week.47 It was hoped that this would reduce inflation to below 10
per cent by the autumn of 1976. But, perversely, by hitting its inflation
target the government would almost certainly breach its monetary objec-
tive: 10 per cent inflation implied nominal GDP growth of 13 per cent,
versus forecast M3 growth of 15.4 per cent.48 This created a conundrum:
bank lending to the private sector would have to increase for economic
recovery to take hold; consistent with the counterparts approach, this
would require an offsetting PSBR reduction to ensure compliance with
the objective of keeping M3 growth below nominal GDP growth. Healey
had endured a torrid time getting less than £1 billion of cuts through
Cabinet ahead of his 1975 Budget, so there was little chance of reducing
43 Goodhart had argued as early as February 1971 that the structural changes brought by
CCC ‘make the case for concentrating on M1’: C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘A new approach to
credit control: some quantitative implications’, 25 February 1971, 3A8/11; J. B. Page,
‘Monetary policy’, April 1973, BOE, 6A50/8.
44 C. W. Kelly, ‘Monetary policy’, 19 February 1973, TNA T233/2505.
45 D. Haig, ‘Monetary policy’, 22 January 1973, TNA, T233/2505.
46 J. B. Page, ‘Monetary policy’, 24 October 1974, BOE, 6A50/13.
47
£6 equated to about 12 per cent for average wage earners. Incomes were frozen for those
earning more than £8,500 per annum: The attack on inflation, Cmnd 6151 (London,
1975).
48 Home Finance Division, ‘Counter-inflation policy: monetary policy’, 27 June 1975,
TNA, T233/2831; G. E. A. Kentfield, ‘Money supply: a look ahead’, 7 July 1975, BOE,
EID4/200.
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the PSBRwith further spending cuts.
49
In July 1975 officials were charged
with ‘restricting the growth of M3 other than by cutting the PSBR’.50The
eventual solution, despite the traumas of CCC, was another M3 target.
Bank Director Kit McMahon explained:
If we can establish internally, with the Treasury, the principle of keeping the
growth in money supply down and taking any necessary measures to that end,
we will in due course get an extra lever on the Chancellor to attack public
expenditure itself. . . [I]f we could get a public statement of a target for the growth
of money supply, we should have a tighter rope round the Chancellor’s neck.
51
TheM3 target imposed on Healey in July 1976 was born of the need to
keep monetary policy consistent with incomes policy in the fight against
inflation. Because of the counterparts approach, it grew to become a
restraint on the spending ambitions of the Labour government – fiscal
policy via the monetary policy back door. There was also the need to calm
the gilt market, which was increasingly concerned about money supply
growth in the crisis year of 1976. AsWass remarked, ‘Notwithstanding the
pain a target could inflict on us later on, the confidence-raising value in the
package could make all the difference between success and failure. Since
we cannot afford failure we must have a target.’52
But, unlike the unpublished M3 target agreed with his Conservative
predecessor in March 1972, there was no econometric evidence under-
pinning Healey’s published target in July 1976. As Anthony Hotson
points out, ‘Britain’s monetary regime was not built on the back of a stable
equation or model of money, but on a conceit intended to shackle the
state’s spending bureaucracies.’53 As Goodhart explained at the time:
The statistical basis for monetarism – a stable relationship between the monetary
aggregates and nominal incomes –which has always beenweaker in theUK than in
the USA for example, has recently largely collapsed. A time when the authorities
have moved towards quantitative monetary targets. . .is perhaps not the best time
to make a big splash about the breakdown of these relationships.54
January 1977 was not the time to ‘make a big splash’ about the lack of
econometric evidence linking the broad money supply to nominal
incomes because, alongside a two-year programme of DCE and PSBR
ceilings agreed with the IMF in return for yet another loan, the Labour
49 D.W.G.Wass,Decline to fall: the making of British macro-economic policy and the 1976 IMF
crisis (Oxford, 2008), 100–1.
50 Kentfield, ‘Money supply: a look ahead’, EID4/200.
51 C. W. McMahon, ‘Monetary policy’, 26 September 1975, BOE, EID4/200.
52 Wass, Decline to fall, 212. 53 Hotson, ‘British monetary targets, 1976 to 1987’, 3.
54 C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘Provisional bulletin article on special deposits and supplementary
special deposits’, 31 January 1977, BOE, 6A50/20.
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government had just announced a new 9 to 13 per cent target range for
£M3 growth in 1976/77. For the next two years the government would be
under the surveillance of both the IMF and the financial markets. Partly
because of this, 1977 saw a rapid return of confidence, allowing Healey to
boast that he was one of the few post-war Chancellors to preside over a
growing economy, falling inflation, falling unemployment and a balance
of payments surplus.55
Conservative monetary policy in opposition
The principal architect of the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, Nigel
Lawson, points out that, in contrast to the detailed consideration of fiscal
policy, an ‘error, in hindsight, was to do so little work in Opposition on the
conduct of monetary policy’.56 This is a startling admission from a min-
ister in a government that placed monetary policy at the heart of its
agenda. After cautiously concluding in favour of published M3 targets
in June 1976, a month before Healey revealed his 12 per cent target, the
Conservatives announced in their October 1976 policy document, The
right approach to the economy, that ‘it would now be right to announce clear
targets for monetary expansion as one of the objectives of economic
management’.57
By Lawson’s account, there was little further consideration of monetary
policy while the Conservatives remained in opposition.58 Detailed work
on the MTFS had to wait not only until the Conservatives were back in
power but until Howe’s first Budget was out of the way, in June 1979.
59
In
the meantime, although there were several meetings between
Conservatives and senior Bank officials, they rarely touched upon the
technicalities of monetary policy.60 Lawson admits: ‘We. . .assumed too
readily that the task was essentially one of applying with conviction the
approach that a reluctant Labour government had had forced upon it by
55 Healey, The time of my life, 400–1. 56 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 17.
57
‘Economic Reconstruction Group: minutes of meeting’, 24 June 1976, Churchill, RDLY
2/1/2/1; Howe et al., The right approach to the economy, 24.
58 Ridley points out that this also reflected doctrinal differences between the Conservatives’
variousmonetarist advisers. Christopher Johnson compares these to the disputes between
Swift’s Lilliputian ‘Little-Endians’ and ‘Big-Endians’ over which end of a boiled egg
should be cracked open. C. Johnson, The economy under Mrs Thatcher, 1979–1990
(London, 1991), 40; Lawson, The view from No. 11, 17–18; conversation with Sir Adam
Ridley, 9 July 2013.
59 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 17.
60 Howe reported to Sir Keith Joseph that ‘I sat next to [Bank Director] McMahon at lunch
and, to me at least, he took a slightly different line to the effect that the Bank and Treasury
did knowmore than you imply about the technicalities’: ‘R. E.G.Howe toK. S. Joseph’, 2
July 1976, Churchill, THCR 2/1/1/30 [underlining by M. H. Thatcher in original];
The 1981 Budget: ‘a Dunkirk, not an Alamein’ 159
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337626.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Cambridge, on 01 Jun 2021 at 10:06:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
the International Monetary Fund.’
61
Nonetheless, glimpses of a medium-
term monetary strategy do emerge from the period of opposition. As Sir
Alan Budd explains in this volume,much of the intellectual foundation for
theMTFS came from the work done at the London Business School after
the imposition of the IMF package in December 1976.62
Before the ‘winter of discontent’ most Conservative policy makers
assumed, like their Labour counterparts, that incomes policy rather than
monetary policy would be the principal weapon against inflation.
Therefore, a great deal of attention was paid by both parties to the
German system ofKonzertierte Aktion (‘concerted action’), whereby man-
agement and the unions combined with a group of ‘wise men’ to arrive at,
inter alia, an acceptable annual wage norm.63 Howe saw such ‘realistic
bargaining’ as a viable alternative to free collective bargaining and the
dirigisme of statutory incomes policies.64 But ‘concerted action’ perished
alongside Callaghan’s wage policy in the winter of 1978–79. Monetary
policy would be forced to bear a far greater share of the anti-inflationary
burden than had ever been intended.
A respray of Labour’s monetary regime
65
In May 1979 the Conservatives inherited an economy recovering smartly
from the ‘winter of discontent’. GDP grew by 4.25 per cent in the second
quarter, and, while inflation was rising, at just below 10 per cent it was a
long way off the 1975 peak.66 Fiscal policy making in opposition had
A. N. Ridley, ‘Meeting with the Bank of England 18th October 1977’, 20 October 1977,
Churchill, TCHR 2/12/2/3; R.K.Middlemas, Power, competition and the state, vol. III, The
end of the post-war era: Britain since 1974 (Basingstoke, 1990), 216.
61 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 18.
62 See also ibid., 69. Howe refers to a March 1978 speech setting out a medium-term
strategy that he delivered as a riposte to speeches by the Governor and the Permanent
Secretary: Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 109. An earlier medium-term plan was laid out in
‘Programme for economic stability’, The Times, 20 September 1976.
63 Thatcher responded to Howe’s proposal by suggesting that successful wage bargaining in
Germany had little to do with ‘concerted action’ and everything to do with ‘the German
character’. As she explained, ‘[T]his German talking shop works because it consists of
Germans’: S. Zweig, ‘Die Konzertiete Aktion’, 1977, Churchill, THCR 2/1/1/31 [anno-
tation byM. H. Thatcher]; ‘R. E. G. Howe toM. H. Thatcher’, 26May 1977, Churchill,
THCR 2/1/1/31 [annotation by M. H. Thatcher].
64 Despite Thatcher’s initial hostility, ‘concerted action’ made it as far as the 1979
Conservative election manifesto.
65 Hotson, ‘British monetary targets, 1976 to 1987’, 19.
66 Inflation bottomed out at 7.4 per cent in June 1978. Some of the rapidGDP growth in 1979
Q2 was consumer spending brought forward in anticipation of the VAT rise in the Budget.
This may not have been obvious to ministers and forecasters in the summer of 1979. The
1979 Q2 GDP figures were not released until September and initially showed a 3 per cent
rise over the quarter: ‘GDP up after winter’, Guardian, 22 September 1979; ONS.
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focused on identifying public expenditure cuts sufficient to finance the
desired income tax cuts.67 In the buoyant economic conditions of
mid-1978, it had appeared that modest cuts, combined with the proceeds
of a growing economy, would be sufficient.68As declining growth and a
rising public sector wage bill increased the PSBR during the winter of
1978–79, however, it became clear that income tax cuts would have to
be financed by indirect tax rises. This formed the basis for Howe’s first
Budget, in June 1979, when he reduced the basic rate of income tax
from 33 to 30 per cent, and the highest rate from 83 to 60 per cent, while
raising VAT to 15 per cent.69 Howe regards this as his most
popular Budget.70 Yet this was the Budget that precipitated the deepest
recession in Britain since the 1920s. Treasury economists estimated
that the ‘revenue-neutral’ tax switch alone would shrink the economy
by 1.7 per cent, wiping out the pre-Budget estimate of 1.5 per cent
growth in 1979/80.71 Chancellors traditionally included a passage in
their Budget speeches estimating the net effect of the measures on
growth. This was dropped in 1979.
72
Officials were told that ministers
doubted the reliability of the forecasts and that, given the apparently
critical state of the economy, there was no realistic alternative to bench-
mark the Budget against.73 The 1979 FSBR did publish a growth
forecast for the coming year of minus 1 per cent. The only indication
that this might be policy-induced was on page 4: ‘In the short term the
reduction in public expenditure is likely to reduce economic activity
67 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 17.
68 D. J. Needham, ‘Fentiman Road: drawing the Conservative fiscal policy threads together
in 1978’ (June 2011), available at www.academia.edu/2431227/Fentiman_Road_
drawing_the_Conservative_fiscal_policy_threads_together_in_1978, MTFW 114053.
69 Prior to the 1979 Budget the standard rate of VATwas 8 per cent, with a 12.5 per cent rate
applied to petrol and certain luxury goods.
70 Howe, Conflict of interest, 121–36.
71 Ministers appear to have overlooked the different behavioural consequences of direct and
indirect tax changes. In the short term, individuals tend to react to a decrease (increase) in
net income (after a direct tax change) by drawing down (adding to) savings to maintain
existing levels of consumption. By contrast, an indirect tax rise increases the cost of
existing consumption, causing individuals to substitute tax-exempt goods for the (now
more expensive) taxed goods, thus narrowing the indirect tax base. The increase in the
general price level after an indirect tax rise also discounts the stock of real wealth. Since
individuals tend to want to hold their real wealth fairly constant, they react to higher prices
with increased saving. This further reduces the overall level of consumption, with addi-
tional negative consequences for overall output. J. B. Unwin, ‘Preparations for the
Budget’, 10 May 1979, TNA, T366/456.
72 Thatcher was advised that ‘certain aspects of this forecast, notably unemployment, the
exchange rate, interest rates and the economic effects of the Budget, are not being quoted
publicly’: H. P. Evans, ‘Post-Budget forecast: the economic outlook to end 1980’, 14 June
1979, TNA, PREM 19/25.
73 [?], ‘Points for brief B4: effects of Budget’, June 1979, TNA, T414/37.
The 1981 Budget: ‘a Dunkirk, not an Alamein’ 161
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337626.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Cambridge, on 01 Jun 2021 at 10:06:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
slightly. This is probably also true of the net effect of reducing direct
and raising indirect taxes.’74
The 1979 Budget was also notable for lowering the £M3 target
range inherited from Labour to 7 to 11 per cent. Howe had flagged his
intention of operating a tighter monetary policy when he first met the Bank
Governor on 9 May.75 This was despite the cautious advice he received on
his first day in the job from both the Treasury and the Bank. The initial
briefing from his own officials warned that ‘no one has succeeded in
establishing a relationship between M3 [sic] and money incomes which
has proved stable during the 1970s’.76 The Chancellor was also advised ‘to
bear inmind that there is no close relationship between £M3and the PSBR’
and that exporters were concerned about the consequences of tighter
monetary policy on an already strong pound.77 The Bank’s advice was
similarly cautious:
Proper control of the money supply is unlikely to become a simple matter. . .
[W]ith a combination of correct judgement and good fortune, the authorities are
able to steer a course that allows the money supply to grow within its permitted
range without this being accompanied by unforeseen, unwelcome, or unacceptable
behaviour of either the rate of exchange or the rate of interest.78
Nonetheless, ministers were keen to provide the markets with ‘a decla-
ration of intent’ that the new government wasmore serious aboutmonetary
policy than its predecessor.79Despite the latest figures showing £M3 accel-
erating out ofHealey’s 8 to 12 per cent target range,Howe decided to lower
the target to 7 to 11 per cent.80Contained within his announcement was an
early indication that a more pragmatic form of ‘monetarism’ would trump
‘believing monetarism’.81 Ministers were not prepared to take responsibil-
ity for the rapid growth of the money supply during the two months of the
financial year that had fallen under Healey’s stewardship. The target would
apply only for the ten months from the date of Howe’s first Budget. If
ministers really believed that the way to reduce inflation was to reduce the
74 FSBR 1979–80 (London, 1979), 4.
75 A. M. W. Battishill, ‘Domestic and overseas monetary policy’, 10 May 1979, TNA,
T386/524.
76 Home Finance Group, ‘Monetary targets and control’, May 1979, TNA, T388/93.
77 Central Unit, ‘Budget’, 26 April 1979, TNA, T388/92; EFI Division, ‘The exchange
rate’, 25 April 1979, TNA, T388/92.
78 Bank of England, ‘Problems of monetary control’, 30 April 1979, TNA, T386/524.
79 N. Lawson, ‘Monetary policy’, May 1979, TNA, T386/524.
80 In the six months to April 1979 £M3 grew by an annualised 12.8 per cent: ‘R. E. G. Howe
to Prime Minister’, 10 May 1979, TNA, T386/524.
81 For a distinction between the various types of monetarist, see G.T. Pepper and
M. J. Oliver, Monetarism under Thatcher: lessons for the future (Cheltenham, 2001).
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rate of growth of the money supply, then it should not have mattered
whether £M3 had grown under a Labour or a Conservative government.82
After growing modestly during the first three months of the new target
period, the money supply burst out of its new range in October 1979.83
The gilt market reacted in typical fashion, and called a buyers’ strike. At a
crisis meeting on 14 November, Richardson told the Prime Minister that
the Bank would need to sell £500 million gilts within the week simply to
get monetary policy back on track.84 In order to do this, interest rates were
raised three percentage points to the highest nominal level in British
history, before or since: 17 per cent. To further placate the markets,
Howe extended the £M3 target for another four months to October
1980.85
The Medium-Term Financial Strategy
The November 1979 monetary mini-Budget delayed the introduction of
the MTFS, which Lawson had been working on since the election. As the
Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, Tim Lankester, remarked, ‘There is
no point in having a medium-term financial plan when the Markets are
dubious about our ability to stay within the existing target.’86 The pros-
pect of smoothing out the short-term monetary difficulties was integral to
the MTFS, however. Lawson reformulated his plan in early 1980. As
Howe explained to Mrs Thatcher, there was
82 Thatcher was already exhibiting aHeath-like distaste for higher interest rates, arguing that
a two percentage point rise in MLR on Budget day would affect the Conservative vote in
the forthcoming European elections. Commenting on this episode, CharlesMoorewrites:
‘Mrs Thatcher was perfecting a technique she was often to deploy – permitting a decision,
but distancing herself from it.’ Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 463; ‘T. P. Lankester to
A. M. W. Battishill’, 11 June 1979, TNA, PREM 19/33.
83 Bank lending to the private sector hit a new record. Bank lending to the public sector was
also higher as VAT payments and telephone bills were delayed by strikes. The Treasury
accountant had failed to anticipate either of these, so the Bank had not scheduled
significant offsetting gilt sales, which, after redemptions, were negative during the
month. J. M. Bridgeman, ‘Gilt edged market: tap stock’, 6 September 1979, TNA,
T386/526.
84
‘T. P. Lankester to M. Hall’, 14 November 1979, TNA, T386/525.
85 Howe also announced that consultations would commence onmoves towards a system of
monetary base control. The monetary base (M0) comprises notes, coin and bankers’
balances at the Bank of England. As a backward-looking, demand-determined aggregate,
M0 has no causative effect on nominal GDP. The Bank privately rejected MBC after
extensive analysis in 1977, and then publicly in 1979; see P. E. Stevenson, ‘Monetary
base, bankers’ balances andmovements in money: some results’, 11 October 1977, BOE,
6A50/23; and Foot, Goodhart and Hotson, ‘Monetary base control’.
86
‘T. P. Lankester to PrimeMinister’, 9 November 1979, TNA, PREM19/34 [emphasis in
original].
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a good deal of force in the argument that by displaying a credible strategy for the
medium term we shall be better able in the Budget to ride out the immediate
problems of high monetary growth and interest rates, which, whatever course we
follow, are still likely to take some time to control.87
Despite substantial gilt sales in January 1980, £M3 was still outside
the 7 to 11 per cent target range at the time of the Budget.88 Lawson’s
proposal offered a way of terming the current monetary difficulties out
over a four-year period. It also offered the tantalising prospect of ‘jam
tomorrow’ in the form of tax cuts just ahead of the next election:
Although the situation in the next two years is still likely to be extremely tight, the
prospect thereafter – as we feel the full benefit of higher North Sea oil revenue – is a
good deal easier and offers the prospect of substantial fiscal relaxation.89
The proposal contained no empirical evidence that control of the broad
money supply was either a necessary or sufficient condition for lower
inflation. As Lawson admitted, it rested on ‘the beneficial effects on
confidence (and hence expectations)’.90 But, as his Cabinet colleague
Sir Ian Gilmour points out, ‘[r]egrettably, trade unionists were not well
versed in monetarist doctrine and had no such expectations, rational or
otherwise’.91
The lack of robust econometric evidence had worried Goodhart when
he was sent a similar proposal by the newly appointed Treasury Chief
Economic Adviser, Terry Burns, and his London Business School col-
league, Alan Budd. Drawing on his practical experience with monetary
targets, Goodhart drafted a letter to Budd:
What really gets to me is the implicit self-confidence that you, Alan Budd, have
now identified a stable demand-for-money function, on which future policy can
firmly be based. After all our experience in recent years, can you seriously claim
that ‘your calculations’ – undemonstrated – are a sound basis for official policy.
Frankly I feel that the process of picking numbers in this way for serious policy
recommendations is breath-taking in its irresponsibility.92
Four months later the Governor was equally annoyed to discover that
Lawson’s proposal had gone to the PrimeMinister before being discussed
87 R. E. G. Howe, ‘Medium Term Financial Strategy’, 20 February 1980, TNA, PREM
19/177.
88 Annualised £M3 growth during the target period was 12.1 per cent: C. J. Riley, ‘Recent
developments’, 7 February 1980, TNA, T386/527.
89 Howe, ‘Medium Term Financial Strategy’, PREM 19/177.
90 N. Lawson, ‘A medium term financial plan’, 24 September 1979, TNA, T386/525.
91 I.H. J. L.Gilmour,Dancingwith dogma: Britain under Thatcherism (London, 1992), 22.
92
‘C. A. E. Goodhart to A. P. Budd’, 24October 1979, BOE, 6A50/31. The letter was never
sent, and, after a conciliatory lunch, the article was toned down for publication.
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with Bank officials. He told Howe that the Bank had ‘serious reservations
about the credibility of the sort of document produced and the wisdom of
publishing it’.93 He believed that the strategy was ‘undesirably dogmatic,
mechanical and rigid’, and reiterated that there was no clear relationship
between changes in the money stock and the price level.94 Richardson
addressed his concerns directly to Thatcher: ‘Monetary policy had to be
defensible. It was hard enough to set a monetary target for one year ahead:
it was much harder for a four year period.’95 The Prime Minister replied
simply that ‘she and the Chancellor were convinced that it would be right
to publish the medium-term targets on the lines of the draft; she hoped
that the Governor would be able to live with this’.96
The Bank was not the only part of the official machine with misgivings.
The head of the Central Policy Review Staff, Sir Kenneth Berrill, warned
that, by ‘deliberately hooking itself on a programme for M3 [sic] which it
intends to stick to come what may’, the government could be in for ‘a very
bloody battle indeed with interest rates, exchange rate, reduced invest-
ment, bankruptcies, at unknown levels’.
97
The Cabinet Secretary, Sir
Robert Armstrong, agreed. Publishing the target ranges four years ahead
allowed ‘nothing for the unforeseen, or for slippage’, and would ‘make life
even more difficult than it is in any case bound to be’.98 More significant
was opposition from within the Treasury ministerial team itself. On
4 March the Chief Secretary, John Biffen, told the Prime Minister that
demand for the strategy came from ‘journalists, academics and com-
mentators rather than from those in the commercial world’.99 Belying
his own monetarist reputation, Biffen doubted whether there was any
mechanistic relationship between the PSBR, the monetary aggregates
and inflation. He finished with pointed criticism of his colleague, Nigel
Lawson: ‘Our monetary policy is still at the stage of apprenticeship. The
Financial Secretary, on the other hand, will suggest a certainty about pace
and direction that we do not possess, either technically or politically.’100
After guiding the proposal through Cabinet, Howe published the
MTFS alongside his March 1980 Budget.101 He also announced that
93 A. J. Wiggins, ‘Note of a meeting held in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s room, HM
Treasury at 9.30 amon Friday, 22ndFebruary 1980’, 25 February 1980, TNA, T386/528.
94 A. J. Wiggins, ‘Note of a meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s room, HM
Treasury on Monday, 3 March at 10.15 am’, 5 March 1980, TNA, T386/528.
95
‘T. P. Lankester to A. J. Wiggins’, 10 March 1980, TNA, T386/529. 96 Ibid.
97 K. E. Berrill, ‘Medium Term Financial Strategy’, 25 February 1980, TNA, PREM
19/177.
98 R. T. Armstrong, ‘Medium Term Financial Strategy’, 26 February 1980, TNA, PREM
19/177.
99 W. J. Biffen, ‘MediumTermFinancial Strategy’, 4March 1980, TNA, PREM19/177.
100 Ibid. 101 FSBR 1980–81.
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the ‘corset’, back in place since 1978, would be discarded for the final time
in June 1980. The ‘corset’’s designers were fully aware that its application
had only a cosmetic effect on the £M3 statistics. Quantitative limits simply
pushed lending out to the overseas branches of the clearing banks, the
wholesale markets and the commercial bill market. Until Howe abolished
exchange controls in October 1979, however, there was a limit to how
much lending a UK bank could divert to, for instance, its Paris branch.
After October 1979 there was no such constraint.102 Nonetheless, the
Bank estimated that £M3would rise by about 3 per cent when the ‘corset’
was finally discarded.103Howe left open the question of whether the target
for 1980/81 would include this ‘reintermediation’.104 Once again, critics
were left asking just how strong ministerial monetarist credentials were
when they were prepared to write off another 3 per cent of £M3 growth.
Further questions were asked four months later when, despite the
latest figures showing the money supply moving out of the target range,
MinimumLending Rate was cut by one percentage point to 16 per cent.105
The Governor pressed for the cut because ‘pressure on the corporate
sector caused by high interest rates and the high exchange rate had
become too great and needed to be moderated’.106 The British economy
was enduring its worst recession for sixty years. This was partly because
of the high price of oil.107 It was partly because of the 1979 Budget, which
shrank the economy with its switch from direct to indirect tax and
public expenditure cuts. But it was mainly because of a misconceived
monetary policy that, whatever the £M3 figures indicated, was imposing
an unprecedented squeeze on British business. The strong pound would
soon make Britain a net importer of manufactured goods for the first time
102 The abolition of exchange controls also effectively ruled out monetary base control. As
Goodhart commented in July 1979, any attempt to limit bank lending by squeezing the
monetary base in the absence of capital controls would produce offshore disintermedia-
tion ‘with a vengeance’: C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘Some notes on Middleton’s “negotiable
base asset scheme”’, 10 July 1979, BOE, C40/1444.
103 P. E. Middleton, ‘The monetary prospect’, 7 November 1979, BOE, C40/1448.
104 HC Deb., 26 March 1980, vol. 981, cc1442–6.
105 Annualised £M3 growth in the current target period was 11.2 per cent: ‘T. P. Lankester
to A. J. Wiggins’, 3 July 1980, TNA, PREM 19/178. Minimum Lending Rate replaced
Bank Rate in October 1972 and tied the Bank’s discount rate to Treasury bill rates then
prevailing in the market, by taking the rate at the previous weekly tender, adding fifty
basis points (one basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point) and then rounding up
to the nearest twenty-five basis points.
106 Ibid.
107 We cannot simply blame the oil shock. The upper turning point in theUnitedKingdom’s
cycle came in May 1979. The US economy (and the rest of the OECD) continued to
grow through 1979, briefly contracted in the second quarter of 1980 and entered
recession in the final quarter of 1981 as Britain, an oil exporter, was exiting its much
deeper recession.
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since before the Industrial Revolution.
108
Gross domestic product fell by
5.9 per cent in the 1979–80 recession.109 Manufacturing output shrank by
15 per cent.110 Manufacturing investment shrank by 26 per cent, and
unemployment reached levels not seen since the 1930s.111
Despite the risks to the credibility of the MTFS, the Prime Minister
and Chancellor agreed to the interest rate cut. As the Governor pointed
out, ‘The money supply figures on their own would scarcely justify a
reduction.’112 Four months into the MTFS, and the Treasury was engag-
ing in intellectual acrobatics to convince ministers that the strategy was on
course: ‘The one point reduction in MLR in July was therefore a calcu-
lated risk; it was not justified by the monetary situation to date but by the
prospects of slower money growth in the future.’113 But, as Andrew
Britton points out, the July 1980 MLR cut meant that ‘the retreat from
monetarism had begun’.114
The authorities narrowly avoided a rout with the publication of the
next month’s banking figures. £M3 grew by 5 per cent in July. Even
adjusting for reintermediation, annualised £M3 growth was 16 per cent,
versus the 7 to 11 per cent target range.115By focusing media attention on
the post-‘corset’ distortions, the authorities just managed to sail
through. But no amount of press briefing could hide the fact that the
strategy was off course when £M3 grew by a further 2.9 per cent over
the next month. Annualised growth was now 17 per cent, even after
adjustments. Lawson concluded that ‘our existing techniques ofmonetary
control have failed’.116 Thatcher reached a similar conclusion after
meeting the Swiss economist Karl Brunner while holidaying on Lake
Zug. Glossing over the fact that the Swiss had recently suspended their
own monetary target, Brunner assured Thatcher that the Bank of
England could easily control the UK money supply within a 2 per cent
band simply by adopting Swiss techniques.117 The immediate outcome
108 In January 1981 sterling was 20 per cent higher against a trade-weighted basket of
currencies than when the Conservatives took office in May 1979.
109 G. Chamberlin, ‘Output and expenditure in the last three UK recessions’, Economic and
Labour Market Review, 4, 8 (August 2010), 52.
110 A. J. C. Britton, Macroeconomic policy in Britain, 1974–87 (Cambridge, 1991), 49. From
its 1979 Q2 peak to its 1982 Q4 trough, manufacturing output fell by 17.6 per cent:
Chamberlin, ‘Output and expenditure’, 54.
111
Economic trends annual supplement (London, 1994), 185.
112
‘T. P. Lankester to A. J. Wiggins’, 3 July 1980, TNA, PREM 19/178.
113 HMT, ‘Money supply, interest rates, the PSBR and the exchange rate’, 6 October 1980,
TNA, T386/545.
114 Britton, Macroeconomic policy, 53.
115 P. E. Middleton, ‘Monetary policy’, 29 August 1980, TNA, T386/543.
116 N. Lawson, ‘Monetary policy’, 1 September 1980, TNA, T386/544.
117
‘K. Brunner to M. H. Thatcher’, 10 September 1980, TNA, PREM 19/178.
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was a series of bad-temperedmeetings with senior Bank officials, followed
by two MBC seminars at which the participants would re-rehearse the
arguments about the merits of monetary base control.118 The more
important outcome was the transformation of the MTFS into what Sir
Samuel Brittan calls the ‘Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy’.119
The ‘Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy’
In his 1980 conference speech, the Director General of the CBI,
Sir Terence Beckett, launched an outspoken attack on the government:
You had better face the brutal fact that the Conservative Party is a rather narrow
alliance. How many of them in Parliament or the Cabinet have actually run a
business? This matters. They don’t all understand you. They think they do, but
they don’t. They are even suspicious of you –many of you –what is worse they don’t
take you seriously. I would not advocate what I am going to say were the cause not
noble – we have got to take the gloves off and have a bare knuckle fight because we
have got to have an effective and prosperous industry.120
On 20 October 1980, after the bellwether Imperial Chemical Industries
had warned that it was poised to announce its worst trading results since
1930, the Prime Minister (a former chemist) asked Wass to ‘explore ways
of mitigating the adverse conditions in which British industry is operating,
so that good and viable companies like ICI should not be driven to the
wall’.121 Wass offered a range of options, including lower interest rates,
capital controls and a pay freeze. The fiscal options were limited because,
despite the autumn forecasts showing that the PBSR outturn for
1980/81 was likely to overshoot the implied MTFS objective by nearly
£3 billion (equivalent to 1¼ per cent of GDP), the Cabinet had, the day
beforehand, reneged on a July commitment to find a further £2 billion of
spending cuts.122
The government’s response to the distress being felt by British business
revealed its new ordering of priorities. With the PSBR overshooting
118
‘Summary record of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street at 1800 hours on 3 September
1980’, 3 September 1980, Churchill, PREM 19/178; ‘T. P. Lankester to A. J. Wiggins’,
9 September 1980, TNA, PREM 19/178; ‘Monetary control seminar: Church House,
29 September 1980: record of the discussion’, TNA, T388/129; T. P. Lankester, ‘Note of
a meeting between the Prime Minister and foreign participants in a seminar on monetary
base control: 1430 hours 30 September at 10 Downing Street’, TNA, T388/129.
119 S. Brittan, The role and limits of government: essays in political economy (London,
1983), 248.
120 T. N. Beckett, ‘Director-General’s national conference speech 1980’, 11 November
1980, TNA, PREM 19/490 [emphasis in original].
121 D. W. G. Wass, ‘Policy options’, 5 November 1980, TNA, T386/534.
122 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 189.
168 Duncan Needham
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337626.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Cambridge, on 01 Jun 2021 at 10:06:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
its MTFS ceiling, tax cuts for business were ruled out. But £M3 was also
overshooting its target range. Nevertheless, Howe plumped for the second
of Wass’s options: a ‘modest’ cut in MLR from 16 to 14 per cent. This
would reduce the cost of debt servicing and help exports by weakening
the pound, 15 per cent higher on a trade-weighted index since the
Conservatives took office. But it would require careful explanation.
There was simply no way of justifying a two percentage point cut in
MLR within the current MTFS framework. So, in the Governor’s words,
the monetary target was taken ‘out of action’ until the Budget.
123
Fiscally, all the Chancellor could do was target the two sectors that were
performing well. The 1979 income tax cuts and continuing high wage
settlements had produced a large shift of wealth to the personal sector.
Howe partially reversed this with a one percentage point hike in employ-
ees’ National Insurance contributions. The high oil price in the wake of
the Iranian revolution meant that the oil industry was generating large
profits, so the Chancellor also announced a supplementary petroleum
duty. But, since neither of these measures would take effect until 1981,
there would be little impact on the PSBR in the current year, then
estimated at £11.5 billion (5¼ per cent of GDP) versus the £8.5 billion
(3¾ per cent of GDP) forecast in the Budget.124 It was now clear, how-
ever, that the fiscal leg of theMTFS was taking priority over the monetary
leg. The government was relieving itself of what Colin Thain calls its
‘naïve monetarist baggage’.125 A more pragmatic approach was required.
The money supply had overshot, the PSBR had overshot, the economy
was in a policy-induced recession and unemployment was about to break
through 2 million. As Britton points out, ‘At this stage “the new begin-
ning” introduced by the Conservative government seemed an almost
unmitigated failure.’126
The 1981 Budget
The origins of the 1981 Budget lay in attempts to mitigate the difficulties
companies such as ICI were experiencing as a result of the deliberate
123 To retain some credibility, the MLR cut was followed by the announcement of three
furthermonetarymeasures: the phasing out of the reserve asset ratio, a greater role for the
market in determining MLR and a new role for the cash ratio observed by the banks.
A. J.Wiggins, ‘Note of ameeting held at 11Downing Street onThursday, 20November,
1980 at 9.00 am’, 20 November 1980, TNA, T386/547.
124 HC Deb., 26 March 1980, vol. 981, cc1446–9.
125 C. Thain, ‘The education of the Treasury: the Medium-Term Financial Strategy
1980–84’, Public Administration, 63, 3 (autumn 1985), 283.
126 Britton, Macroeconomic policy, 54.
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squeeze on profits, operated through a misconceived monetary policy.
Early budget planning focused on ameliorating the situation by trans-
ferring resources from the personal sector to the corporate sector. Given
the political difficulties of raising income tax rates so soon after the 1979
Budget, this would likely involve only partial indexation of the personal
allowances and higher indirect taxes. AsWilliamKeegan points out, given
Lawson’s close involvement with the Rooker–Wise amendment, which
had codified indexation in 1977, this ‘might have embarrassed a lesser
man’.
127
Lawson himself recalls that he ‘had no hesitation in supporting
this course of action’ since indexation, while a presumption, was not
automatic.128
Potential measures to help companies included the abolition of the
employers’ National Insurance surcharge (the CBI’s preferred option),
reduced corporation tax, a reduction of heavy fuel oil duty and relief from
local rates. As the Budget approached, however, successive forecasts
showed the PSBR significantly overshooting the MTFS-implied £7.4 bil-
lion ceiling for 1981/82. Even allowing for the £2 billion of tax rises
announced in the November Statement, the winter forecast generated a
PSBR estimate of £10.2 billion (4.1 per cent of GDP) for the year ahead – a
figure Howe revealed to a gathering of ministers and advisers at Chequers
on 17 January 1981.129 Thatcher was ‘not amused’.130 Any extra revenue
coming from the personal sector would now have to go towards reducing
the PSBR rather than alleviating corporate distress if the MTFS were to
retain any credibility. As Sir Tim Lankester shows in this volume, barring
some horse-trading between No. 10 and the Treasury over the exact size of
the tax hike, the fiscal lines of the 1981 Budget were set.
Themonetary policy lines had been laid down by the decision to reduce
interest rates the previous July, and then again in November, despite
above-target monetary growth. The decision to further loosen monetary
policy was given traction by a report from the Swiss economist Jürg
Niehans into the causes of sterling appreciation.131 Alfred Sherman of
the Centre for Policy Studies had commissioned the report by Alan
Walters’ former Johns Hopkins University colleague in October 1980.
On 7 January 1981 Niehans reported his findings to a group of officials
and policy advisers. Flatly contradicting the Treasury view that the pound
was strong because of North Sea oil, he concluded that the root cause was
monetary. £M3 may have been growing well above target, but M0 had
127 Keegan, Mrs Thatcher’s economic experiment, 169.
128 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 95.
129 H. P. Evans, ‘Summary of short-term forecasts’, 12 February 1981, TNA, T388/197.
130 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 202. 131 Niehans, The appreciation of sterling, WTRS 1/4.
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been shrinking in real terms since the middle of 1979. Claiming a link
between M0 and the exchange rate, Niehans recommended that interest
rates be cut immediately and M0 allowed to expand by 5 to 6 per cent.
This, according to Niehans, would allow sterling to fall from $2.40 to a
more comfortable $2.15.
Walters, newly arrived asMrs Thatcher’s economic adviser, wrote in his
diary that the No. 10 advisers greeted the news that the government had
inflicted unnecessary damage on the economy by following the wrong
monetary aggregate as a ‘bombshell’.
132
The Prime Minister’s reaction
fell some way short of her 1979 manifesto pledge for ‘more open and
informed discussion of the Government’s economic objectives’: ‘Told
MT about JN’s seminar and his findings. MT very defensive: NO ONE
must know about it – especially Bank of England.Why? Frightened of calls
for relaxation or sops to the wets. Am rapidly learning the political game –
never admit to an error.’133 Walters’ colleague in the No. 10 Policy Unit,
John Hoskyns, elaborates: ‘Niehans’ advice was not politically welcome.
Despite the diplomatic language in which it was couched, it advocated
actions that could be seen as a public admission that the Government had
done the economy a great deal of damage by mistake.’134
The report bolstered the PrimeMinister’s view that the principal aim of
the forthcoming Budget was to relieve corporate distress by continuing to
lower interest rates, without appearing to execute the U-turn that she had
so publicly ruled out at the Conservative Party conference the previous
October. She hoped to achieve this by lowering the PSBR. This rested on
the belief that the lower the deficit, the lower the interest rate. Lawson now
admits that this belief is ‘largely a fallacy’.135 He goes on, however: ‘Many
of us, I confess, believed in it to some extent at that time, but nobody
believed in it more strongly than she did.’136 The intention had always
been to attack wage inflation by using tight monetary policy to bear down
on company profits. Confirmation that the additional misery heaped upon
British business by the high exchange rate was not an inevitable conse-
quence of North Sea oil, however, meant that a monetary problem (the
strong pound) could now be met with a monetary solution (lower interest
rates), albeit via a fiscal route (higher taxes). This would have the added
advantage of reducing the corporate debt-servicing burden, since each
132 A. A. Walters, ‘Diary entry’, 7 January 1981, Churchill, WTRS 3/1/1.
133 1979 Conservative Party general election manifesto (London, 1979); Walters, ‘Diary entry’,
WTRS 3/1/1 [emphasis in original].
134 Hoskyns, Just in time, 279.
135 Needham, Oliver and Riley, ‘The 1981 Budget: facts and fallacies’, 33. 136 Ibid.
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percentage point off MLR would reduce the company sector’s interest
payments by £270 to 300 million.137
Niehans may have reinforced the view in No. 10 that monetary policy
needed to be further loosened. Lawson claims that, as far as the Treasury
was concerned, the report was ‘inconsequential’.138 Certainly, the initial
reaction was sceptical, with Middleton branding it ‘theology’.139 Despite
Thatcher’s prohibition, officials enlisted Bank support to challenge its
findings. Goodhart has described the report as ‘one of the most important
unpublished papers of our times’.
140
This is not to say that he agreed with
it. He dismissed its claim to have found causation running from the
monetary base to the exchange rate.141 Similar work by Bank officials
had failed to establish any such link, and, given their long campaign
against monetary base control, they were reluctant to accept that M0
had much to contribute to exchange rate management.142 Nonetheless,
while they disagreed with Niehans’ method, they agreed with his conclu-
sions. Interest rates had to be lowered beforemore British businesses were
unnecessarily bankrupted.
Given its difficult experience with the money supply since the early
1970s, the Bank had been hostile to the monetary leg of the MTFS from
the outset. By early 1981 even MTFS cheerleaders within the Treasury
were reluctantly coming round to the Bank’s long-held views about
the limited merits of £M3 targets. In their ongoing search for a stable
demand for money function, Treasury economists had recently formu-
lated an equation that showed financial wealth to be the main driver of
money balances.
143
Since individuals like to keep their proportion of
money to financial assets fairly steady, it was not surprising that, in a
year of rapidly rising money incomes (up 18 per cent in 1980/81), the
137 S. J. Davies, ‘Effect of interest rate change on ICC’s finances’, 24 February 1981, TNA,
T386/552; J. R. Lomax, ‘Effect of cut in MLR on companies’, 25 February 1981, TNA,
T386/552.
138 Needham, Oliver and Riley, ‘The 1981 Budget: facts and fallacies’, 27.
139 Upon being told that the strong poundwas a consequence of monetary policy rather than
North Sea oil, Hoskyns reports that ‘Peter’s face was a study’: Hoskyns, Just in time, 256;
P. E. Middleton, ‘Study by Niehans’, 3 February 1981, TNA, T388/200.
140 Ibid. The paper was published as Niehans, The appreciation of sterling: causes, effects,
policies.
141
‘C. A. E. Goodhart to J. R. Lomax’, 25 February 1981, TNA, T388/189.
142 G. Hacche, ‘The appreciation of sterling in relation to monetary developments: further
equations using M1 and base money’, 20 February 1981, TNA, T388/189.
143 Indeed, Treasury economists concluded that income ‘has no role to play’. Elsewhere,
Britton suggested that the relationship between £M3 and financial assets was ‘new and
controversial’: A. J. C. Britton, ‘Themoney supply target in retrospect’, 13 January 1981,
TNA, T388/187; Bennett, ‘Direct forecast of the money supply’, January 1981, TNA,
T388/186.
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money supply should have grown by a similar amount. Monetarist ortho-
doxy stated that this large rise in £M3 would inevitably lead to higher
inflation, after the usual time lag. If the personal sector had merely been
restoring its real money balances to an equilibrium level, however, then
the extra money would not lead to an inflationary increase in spending
on goods and services. This was the view of the Treasury minister, Lord
Cockfield, who argued that ‘the growth in the money supply has no
implications for the future: its potential for future trouble was exhausted
even before it was created’.
144
The extra money was simply an ex post
facto validation of increased personal wealth. This was a sizeable blow to
the monetarist theory underpinning the MTFS.
The monetarist case was further undermined by the findings of a
thoroughgoing Treasury study, which concluded that inflation was not
simply a monetary phenomenon.145 As Andrew Britton, then at the
Treasury, pointed out, ‘The simple account of inflation in terms of
monetary growth two years previously, which received a lot of public
attention in the mid-seventies, has not stood up well to closer inspection,
or to the test of time.’146 World prices, the exchange rate, indirect taxes,
and incomes policies had all made significant contributions to RPI
growth.147 This is what the Conservative Treasury team had assumed in
1975 before the monetarists’ Jacobin revolution.148
Even Peter Middleton, the Treasury official most associated with the
MTFS, was losing his faith:
The events of the last year or two have called in question the status of £M3 as ‘the’
money supply. It is difficult to control, either by existing methods or by MBC; its
144 F. A. Cockfield, ‘The money supply and inflation’, 21 January 1981, TNA, T386/549.
145 HMT, ‘Report of money supply and inflation research group’, 9 December 1980, TNA,
T388/195.
146 A. J. C. Britton, ‘Conditionality and money supply targets’, 16 January 1981, TNA,
T388/187. As former Bank Director William Allen points out: ‘The events of 1971–75
appear to have been unique: there is no other episode in UKmonetary history in the last
century in which broad money gives so accurate a prediction of future inflation.’
W. A. Allen, ‘Recent developments in monetary control in the United Kingdom’, in
L.H. Meyer (ed.), Improving money stock control: problems, solutions, and consequences
(Boston, MA, 1983), 104.
147 Britton, ‘Conditionality and money supply targets’, T388/187.
148 In June 1975 Adam Ridley advised Howe’s Economic Reconstruction Group: ‘Money,
like other commodities, is subject to the laws of supply and demand. It follows directly
therefore that a Government cannot have exclusive and total control over the money
stock and its deployment.’ He went on, ‘[Inflation] is not determined uniquely by any
single one of the unions and monopoly power, expectations, excess demand, militancy,
wages, the money supply or the Government. To focus on one factor to the exclusion of
the others is to indulge in a dispute which is at best semantically confusing and at worst
deliberately misleading.’ A. N. Ridley, ‘Institutional considerations’, 26 June 1975,
Churchill, RDLY 2/1/2/2 [emphasis in original].
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economic significance is not as clear-cut as it once seemed, and it does not provide
a clear guide to short term interest rates.149
There was nothing in this statement that the Bank could not have told him
nearly a decade beforehand. It made a mockery of Lawson’s reference to
‘those variables – notably the quantity of money – which are and must be
within the power of Governments to control’.150 It also chimed with the
findings of a report by the majority-Conservative Treasury and Civil
Service Committee, which concluded, a fortnight before the 1981
Budget, that there was no evidence of causality running from £M3 growth
to inflation.
151
The report was particularly scathing of the view that
monetary targets could reduce inflation by working on expectations, and
called for a more pragmatic approach that relied less on any single mon-
etary aggregate. By this stage, even the Conservative Research
Department had given up: ‘The fact is that the MTFS, as set out in last
year’s Red Book, is a shambles whether one takes M3 [sic], Government
spending, PSBR, or growth rates, and the publication of precise monetary
targets has made political life more difficult than would otherwise have
been the case.’
152
The need to retain political credibility militated against abandoning
£M3 targets straightaway. But, with the MTFS target set at 6 to 10 per
cent for 1981/82, there was simply no way the eight percentage point
overshoot in 1980/81 could be clawed back without plunging the econ-
omy even further into recession. The Chancellor would have to point to
other factors to explain why he was doing nothing about the overshoot.
But, as Middleton explained, ‘[t]he more successfully we justify that
overshoot, the more our unconditional commitment to future targets and
the precise MTFS path is weakened’.153 Ministers and officials consid-
ered making the £M3 target conditional upon an exchange rate objec-
tive.154 They considered giving £M3 and M1 equal billing. They even
considered the Bank’s long-preferred option of switching to anM1 target.
Unable to reach a consensus, and with the imminent arrival of a new M2
aggregate holding out the prospect of a better alternative, the Treasury
149 P. E. Middleton, ‘The money supply target’, 29 January 1981, TNA, T386/549.
150 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 69.
151 Third report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee:Monetary Policy (London,
1981).
152 C. Mockler, ‘Monetary policy’, 5 February 1981, Oxford, Bodleian Library,
Conservative Party Archive, CRD 4/4/11.
153 Middleton, ‘The money supply target’, T386/549 [emphasis in original].
154 A. J. Wiggins, ‘Note of a meeting held in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s room, on
Tuesday, 3 February, 1981 at 3.00 pm’, 4 February 1981, TNA, PREM 19/438.
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settled on a fudge.
155
In his 1981 Budget, Howe restated the annualised
MTFS target range of 6 to 10 per cent £M3 growth over the fourteen
months to April 1982, while admitting that he would also monitor the
behaviour ofM1 and two wider measures of private sector liquidity, PSL1
and PSL2.156 In the course of his speech, he also mentioned the exchange
rate, inflation and house prices as influences over monetary policy, while
skating over the question of the previous year’s overshoot by simply
stating, without precise commitment, that ‘it may be desirable to recover
some of the past year’s high monetary growth in the form of lower growth
over the medium term’.157
All this would seem to belie the claims of those involved that monetary
policy was of secondary importance in planning the 1981 Budget.158This
is because, despite a series of complicated tactical decisions, No. 10, the
Treasury and the Bank were all agreed that monetary policy had to be
loosened. The only question was by how much. Anticipating a cut ahead
of the Budget, themarkets had takenwholesale rates belowMLR, creating
the room for a one percentage point cut in early February. The Governor
and the Chancellor were keen.159 So too was the Prime Minister, who
expressed her clear wish ‘to give industry a boost’.160The decision to wait
for the Budget was ultimately about salvaging political credibility. As
Lawson pointed out to Howe: ‘In political terms the announcement of
an MLR cut promises to be the one bull point of your Budget speech,
when it ought to be possible to present it in an appropriate monetary and
fiscal context. To put in your finger and pull out that plum now would
leave the Budget cake very unappetising indeed.’
161
Lawson was referring
to the ‘unappetising’ decision, discussed above, to reverse some of the
1979 income tax cuts by (at that stage) only partially indexing personal
allowances, and further raising indirect taxes. As Tim Lankester shows,
the exchanges between No. 10 and the Treasury over the next fortnight
155 M2 comprised M1 plus UK private sector sterling time deposits with UK deposit
banks.
156 PSL1 comprisedM1 plus private sector time deposits with a maturity of up to two years,
private sector holdings of sterling certificates of deposit, and private sector holdings of
monetary instruments (bank bills, Treasury bills, local authority deposits and certificates
of tax deposit). PSL2 comprised PSL1 plus private sector holdings of building society
deposits (excluding term shares and SAYE), plus National Savings (excluding saving
certificates, SAYE and other long-term deposits), minus building society holdings of
money market instruments and bank deposits. Hotson, ‘British monetary targets, 1976
to 1987’, 30; FSBR 1981–82, 16.
157 HC Deb., 10 March 1981, vol. 1000, c762.
158 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 205; Lawson, The view from No. 11, 88.
159 A. J. Wiggins, ‘Monetary affairs’, 12 February 1981, TNA, T386/550.
160 T. P. Lankester, ‘Note for the record’, 13 February 1981, TNA, T386/550.
161 N. Lawson, ‘Minimum lending rate’, 11 February 1981, TNA, T386/550.
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concerning the finer details made only a marginal difference to the final
package. And any lingering suggestions that the 1981 Budget was ‘Made
in Downing Street’ at the eleventh hour are dismissed by the text of a
collective letter of resignation, drafted by the three No. 10 Policy Unit
advisers, Walters, Hoskyns and David Wolfson, when they saw the final
package:
We believe the time has now come for your No. 10 advisers to disband and leave
Whitehall. The opportunity to turn the UK economy round, presented by theMay
1979 mandate has passed. . . We have had 3 misjudged budgets in a row with
no consultation with the colleagues. Even AW has been kept out because he was
being ‘awkward’. Treasury officials know it’s a disaster but, in contrast, they
daren’t say so.162
As Lawson points out, paternity claims over the 1981 Budget arise
from the subsequent eight years of economic growth.163 The mood of
the time was very different. It is summed up by the then head of theNo. 10
Policy Unit, John Hoskyns: ‘For me, and I think for the other Number
Ten advisers, the Budget was never some great battle honour to be
celebrated in song and legend. We saw it as a Dunkirk, not an Alamein;
a narrow escape, the closest we had come to an early end of the Thatcher
experiment.’164
Conclusions
In the introduction, it was suggested that successful policy implementa-
tion requires that all the members of the ‘macroeconomic executive’ be
travelling like ships in a convoy; in the same direction if not always at
precisely the same speed. It also requires that each ship’s crew have a clear
idea of the destination. This was not the case during the two least suc-
cessful periods of monetary policy in post-war Britain. In 1971 the Bank
mis-sold Competition and Credit Control to the Heath government on its
supposed competitive merits. In 1980 the Thatcher government bounced
the Bank into the Medium-Term Financial Strategy without adequate
consultation. The result, in both cases, was above-target money supply
growth. In 1972–73 this was followed by higher inflation. In 1980–81 it
was not.
Another contrast between these two periods of rapid monetary growth
is that, in 1971, the Bank believed it had firm econometric evidence to
show that the demand for broad money in the United Kingdom was
162
‘A. A. Walters, D. Wolfson and J. L. A. H. Hoskyns to Prime Minister’, 3 March 1981,
Churchill, WTRS 1/1.
163 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 88. 164 Hoskyns, Just in time, 283.
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stable, predictable and controllable, and that (for the most part) causality
ran fromM3 to nominal incomes. After CCC, officials knew, once again,
that none of this was true. Elsewhere in this volume, Anthony Hotson
explains why the Bank’s narrow money equations also broke down in the
early 1980s. In 1979, though, the Bank believed it had identified a toler-
ably robust relationship between M1 growth and nominal income. Why,
then, was theMTFS not predicated onM1 targets? The answer lies in the
institutional structure that prevailed. The credit counterparts approach
suggested that the broad money supply could be influenced by fiscal
policy (the PSBR), bank lending to the private sector, and the external
accounts. By contrast, controlling M1 is principally about more frequent
interest rate changes. This would have meant more interest-rate-setting
powers for the Bank – something the politicians and the Treasury were not
prepared to countenance until after the ERM debacle in 1992. As the
Treasury’s Michael Bridgeman noted in 1977, the Bank was ‘pursuing a
dream of being given a monetary target and independent authority to
achieve it, and against this background M1 had definite advantages for
them’.165 Conservative ministers’ mistrust of the Bank prevented them
from choosing monetary targets they might have been able to hit.166
Failure to engage with the Bank on the MTFS produced a policy with
two fundamental flaws in 1980. First, despite the failures of Competition
and Credit Control, more active monetary policy had re-emerged as an
adjunct to incomes policy in 1975. After the ‘winter of discontent’ the
broad money supply target had to fill the role it had previously shared
with a wage norm between 1975 and 1979. As we have seen, it was not up
to the job. A policy based on credibility and managing expectations relied
on the government actually hitting its targets, and, as the Bank, the Chief
Secretary, the Permanent Secretary, the Cabinet Secretary and the CPRS
warned in 1980, this was not likely to happen with £M3.
Second, if minsters had engaged with the Bank, they would have known
that the primary purpose of theM3 target imposed onHealey in July 1976
was fiscal rather than monetary. It was ‘a tighter rope round the
Chancellor’s neck’ on public expenditure. This also went to the heart of
the Bank’s objections to monetary base control. As Goodhart pointed out
in July 1979, quite apart from the lack of econometric evidence linkingM0
growth to nominal incomes,
165 K. V. Watts, ‘Note of a meeting held in Sir Douglas Wass’ room at 3.15 pm on
Wednesday, 9 November’, 10 November 1977, TNA, T386/269.
166 Thatcher referred to Richardson as ‘that fool who runs the Bank of England’, while
Lawson makes the extraordinary suggestion that the Bank ‘had never at that time taken
monetary policy very seriously or. . .thought deeply about it’. Moore,Margaret Thatcher,
462; Lawson, The view from No. 11, 17, 83.
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The ability to control the growth of the quota regulated monetary aggregate [M0]
would relax the present monetary discipline on the authorities, allowing them to
run higher PSBRs and keep MLR down, ‘secure’ in the knowledge that quota
restraint was keeping £M3 on track. It could encourage a considerable degree of
comfortable self-deception among the authorities.
167
Money supply targets in the late 1970s were primarily about restraining
the spending ambitions of the Labour government. Before the emergence
of the Social Democratic Party and victory in the Falklands, this was an
issue that might have re-emerged after the 1983 general election. But few
doubted the Thatcher government’s desire to reduce the PSBR. There
was little need to influence fiscal policy by the monetary policy back door.
By failing to engage with the Bank, Conservative ministers selected the
wrong target. This had profound consequences for British economic
performance in the early 1980s.
Wemust consider the possibility that minsters were perfectly aware that
there was no robust relationship between £M3 growth and inflation, and
that money supply targets were simply ‘cover’ for tough deflationary
action.168 After all, this was the approach taken by Paul Volcker at the
Federal Reserve. In 1978 Volcker saw ‘no need to accept as complete, or
even adequate, a simple causal explanation running from monetary
behavior to price behavior’.169 But he was quite prepared to use monetary
targets as cover for a deflationary squeeze. Lawson commented privately
in the 1970s that ‘the conditions for monetarism in Britain do not exist’.
When asked what they were, he replied: ‘Water cannon.’170Cockfield was
certainly under no illusions about the monetary transmission mechanism:
‘Control of the money [supply] operates through the simple but brutal
means of butchering company profits. Ultimately insolvency and unem-
ployment teach employers and workers alike that they need to behave
reasonably and sensibly.’171
Nonetheless, subsequent comments by ministers, officials and advisers
show that we should take their public statements about monetarism at the
time at face value. Looking back on the MTFS, Lawson quotes Robert
167 Goodhart, ‘Some notes on Middleton’s “negotiable base asset scheme”’, C40/1444.
168 Wass commented in November 1980 that ‘nor can it be argued that business conditions
as they have evolved this year are very much worse than we expected when we set the
current targets and formulated the MTFS’: Wass, ‘Policy options’, T386/534.
169 P.A.Volcker, ‘The role of monetary targets in an age of inflation’, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 4, 2 (April 1978), 330.
170 Quoted by R.K.Middlemas, ‘Margaret Thatcher, 1979–1990’, in V.B. Bogdanor (ed.),
From new Jerusalem to new Labour: British prime ministers from Attlee to Blair (Basingstoke,
2010), 151.
171 Cockfield, ‘The money supply and inflation’, T386/549.
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Burns: ‘The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men/Gang aft a-gley.’
172
Middleton has commented that ‘having a target and missing it turned
out to be quite a good policy. It allowed for flexibility.’173 And Hoskyns
writes that ‘the excessive monetary squeeze of 1979–81 [was] an embar-
rassing error and. . .the Government’s most difficult and unpopular action
in its first term, the 1981 Budget, [was] designed to correct it’.174
As Christopher Collins explains in this volume, the fiscal tightening of
the 1981 Budget helped to provide ‘cover’ for the unwinding of the
monetarist experiment.
In October 1980 Thatcher declared ‘the lady’s not for turning’. Five
months later, having already taken themoney supply target ‘out of action’,
her Chancellor executed a brisk U-turn on monetary policy. By this
stage it was clear that monetary policy was being driven at least as
much by the exchange rate as by the money supply. In June 1981
Lawson sent Howe a note extolling the virtues of British membership of
the European Monetary System, the policy that would reach its full
expression with Britain’s ill-fated membership of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism after 1990.175 In his March 1982 Budget, Howe formalised
the shift away from £M3 targets by introducing targets for M1 and
PSL2. He also raised the remaining £M3 target by three percentage
points, again with no attempt to claw back the 3.7 percentage point
overshoot in 1981/82. This enabled the Conservative government, in
1983, finally to hit one of its (revised) £M3 targets. At Thatcher’s sug-
gestion, signed charts were produced to commemorate the event.176 The
Bank’s Chief Economist, Christopher Dow, assumed that this was a
joke.177 It was not.
After the 1983 general election, Howe was succeeded as Chancellor by
Lawson, who, after briefly suspending his broad money target in October
1985, published his final – 11 to 15 per cent – £M3 target range in March
1986.178 But, as Christopher Johnson remarks,
In March 1986 £M3 was dragged out of its coffin for a last death-ride. Unlike El
Cid, riding dead in the saddle at the head of his troops to his final victory, it
impressed nobody.179
172 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 72.
173 Quoted by P. F.C. Stephens, Politics and the pound: the Tories, the economy and Europe
(London, 1997), 34.
174 Hoskyns, Just in time, 391. 175 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 111.
176 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 282.
177 Hacche and Taylor, Inside the Bank of England, 216.
178 The M1 and PSL2 targets were replaced by M0 in 1984.
179 Johnson, The economy under Mrs Thatcher, 55.
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Within a year Lawson was shadowing the deutschmark, the policy that
presaged Britain’s brief and unhappymembership of the ERM.180 In 1988
Middleton wrote: ‘Monetary policy. . .has assumed the role for which it is
best suited: the achievement of whatever goals are set for nominal
demand.’181 The authors of the Radcliffe Report would have recognised
this twin focus on the exchange rate and demandmanagement. Monetary
policy had come full circle. It was almost as if the monetarist ‘revolution’
had never happened.
180
‘Monitoring ranges’ for M0 and M4 remained in place until 1997 but were relatively
unimportant to the conduct of monetary policy.
181 Middleton succeeded Wass as Permanent Secretary in 1983: P. E.Middleton,
‘Economic policy formation in the Treasury in the post-war period’, National Institute
Economic Review, 127, 1 (February 1989), 50.
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